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WASHINGTON'S RETREAT FROM CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT-Meyer v. University of Washington, 105 Wn. 2d 847, 719
P.2d 98 (1986).
Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976
(the Fees Act)' to provide fees sufficient to attract competent counsel for
civil rights plaintiffs, and thereby to promote private enforcement of civil
3
rights laws. 2 Ten years later, in Meyer v. University of Washington, the
Washington Supreme Court transformed the Fees Act into a shield for civil
rights violators which will deter bona fide civil rights claims.
This Note reviews the history of the Fees Act, critiques the Meyer court's
analysis of the Act, and proposes alternate methods of evaluating claims of
prevailing defendants. The Meyer court misinterpreted the Fees Act. Not
only did the court use an inappropriate standard to evaluate an attorney fees
claim, but also misapplied that standard.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976

Although the general American rule is that parties to a lawsuit pay their
own attorneys, 4 statutory exceptions to this rule abound. 5 At the federal
level, the most common exception is for private attorneys general. 6 Under
this exception, parties who promote public interests by successfully litigating private disputes are awarded attorney fees. Congress frequently enacts
private attorney general provisions to implement laws that are desirable but
difficult to enforce. 7 These provisions are particularly crucial to realizing
the promise of civil rights laws. 8 Virtually every civil rights law passed
after 1964 contains an express attorney fees provision as an incentive to
private enforcement. 9
After Congress began including attorney fees provisions in civil rights
laws, some courts went beyond the congressional mandate and awarded
1.
2.
NEws
3.
4.

Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641(1976) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1988(1981)).
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
5909-10 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
105 Wn. 2d 847, 719 P.2d 98 (1986).
E.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).

5. E.g., id. at 260 n.33 (listing federal fee shifting statutes).
6. SENATE RePoR, supra note 2, at 3; see also, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C.
99 78i(e), 78r(a) (1981); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1981).
7. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' FeesforAbuses of theJudicialSystem, 61 N.C.L. REv. 613, 614 &
n.8 (1983) (listing federal statutes containing fee shifting provisions as a means of encouraging private

enforcement).
8. See, e.g., SENATE RmEoRT, supra note 2, at 3.
9.

Id. at3-4.
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attorney fees to civil rights plaintiffs without express authorization.' 0
Courts based these awards on the general legislative policy of encouraging
private vindication of civil rights violations. II These courts reasoned that
this legislative policy permitted them to use their inherent equitable powers
to promote litigation of constitutional claims by making awards of attorney
fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 12
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 13 however, the
United States Supreme Court ended nonstatutory fee awards to private
attorneys general. 14 Although Alyeska recognized that judges have inherent
power to award attorney fees in certain exceptional circumstances, 15 the
Court refused to allow judges to fashion their own fee shifting schemes to
promote private enforcement of difficult-to-enforce laws. 16 Congress, the
Alyeska Court explained, was the proper forum for determining which
actions merit such fee awards. 17 The Court also suggested that Congress
should define the boundaries of a judge's discretion to make these attorney
fees awards. 18
The Fees Act is the congressional response to Alyeska. 19 The Act
delineates specific statutory actions in which courts may, at their discretion, award attorney fees to the prevailing party. 20 Further, the detailed
legislative reports which accompany the Fees Act respond to the Alyeska
Court's call for congressionally imposed limits on judicial discretion. 2 1

10.

See, e.g., Dyer v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Martinolich v. Dean, 256 F

Supp. 612 (S.D. Miss. 1966); see also Hearings on the Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of
Representation Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 888-1024, 1060-62 (1973) (listing federal cases awarding fees to
"private attorneys general" without express statutory mandate).
11. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
12. E.g., Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18,24 (N.D. Cal. 1973); La Raza Unida v. Volpe,

57 F.R.D. 94, 98-102 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
13.
14.

421 U.S. 240 (1975).
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 269.

15.
16.

Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 269.

17. Id. at 263-64.
18. Id. at 262.
19. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4: "This bill ...
is an appropriate response to the Alyeska
decision."
20. Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981). The Act provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of
this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs.

Id.
21.
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SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4, 5.

Civil Rights Attorney Fees
Congress intended the purpose of the Fees Act to control the discretion
of the courts. 22 The Act was passed to encourage prosecution of valid civil
rights claims. 23 In its legislative reports, Congress sharply distinguished
prevailing plaintiffs from defendants, setting a minimum standard for
awarding fees to prevailing plaintiffs and a strict standard for granting
24
awards to prevailing defendants.
Where plaintiffs prevail, attorney fees are to be awarded as a matter of
course, except when special circumstances make such awards unjust.2 5 On
the other hand, when defendants prevail, attorney fee awards are to be made
only when the plaintiff litigated in bad faith. 26 The senate report explains
that private attorneys general should not be deterred from bringing good
faith civil rights actions by the prospect of being forced to pay opponents'
27
attorney fees.

II.

MEYER V. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Carl Beat Meyer resigned from the University of Washington faculty two
months after the Washington Supreme Court decided Meyer.28 Until then,
he was a tenured chemistry professor. 29 Meyer was issued a written reprimand by the chemistry faculty for writing memoranda which the faculty
found to contain "many distortions and misleading statements."' 30 The
chemistry faculty discussed and voted upon the reprimand at a closed
executive session which Meyer did not attend. 31 Afterwards, Meyer filed a
grievance with the University of Washington Faculty Grievance Commit32
tee, alleging the reprimand was improper and defamatory.
After a formal hearing, the grievance committee held the reprimand
"was not in accordance with procedures prescribed by the faculty code, and
22. See id. at 6.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id. at 4, 5.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id.
28. Interview with Steve Milam, Assistant Attorney General, State of Washington, in Seattle
(Sept. 25, 1986).
29. Meyer v. University of Washington, 105 Wn. 2d 847, 848, 719 P.2d 98, 100 (1986).
30. See Undisputed Material Facts, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Dismissal
of Plaintiff's Complaint at 12, Meyer v. University of Washington, No. 81-2-07388-3 [hereinafter
Findings and Order] (setting forth the university's version of the reprimand against Professor C. Beat
Meyer). See infra note 136 for a discussion of the factual issue as to the content of the reprimand.
31. Findings and Order, supra note 30, at 11.
32. Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at 849, 719 P.2d at 100. This grievance was added to a pending grievance
regarding denials of salary increases and other matters, which Meyer had filed in November 1978.
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does not appear to meet a rigorous standard of fairness.", 33 Nonetheless, the
president of the university decided to let the reprimand stand. 34
Rather than appeal the university's administrative decision, Meyer filed a
civil rights action in state court, 35 alleging violation of his constitutional
right to free speech and unconstitutional deprivation of liberty and property
without due process of law. 36 After nearly eighteen months of discovery,
Meyer moved for partial summary judgment. 37 The university responded
by moving for dismissal, 38 and the trial court dismissed Meyer's claims
with prejudice. 39 In addition, the court ordered Meyer to pay the university
$50,000 in attorney fees. 40 The Washington Supreme Court unanimously
41
affirmed.
The supreme court held that the trial court properly dismissed Meyer's
free speech claim because his statements were not protected speech. 42 In
the court's view, Meyer's statements addressed matters of personal interest
rather than public interest, and therefore were not protected by the first
33. Meyer v. Chemistry Dept., University of Washington Grievance Committee 8-9 (1980)
(unpublished) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
34. Findings and Order, supra note 30, at 14. President Gerberding did not follow the holding of the
grievance committee and overturn the reprimand. He did, however, indicate that "the reprimand may
not be viewed as an institutional action, but solely that of a group of departmental colleagues." Id.
35. Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at 849, 719 P.2d 100. Professor Meyer could have appealed the decision of
President Gerberding under § 28B.19.150 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW). WASH. REV.
CODE § 28B. 19.150 (1985). The trial court held that Meyer's claim was precluded by his failure to
appeal President Gerberding's administrative ruling. The trial judge who considered the cross-motions
for summary judgment stated "looking at it from the four corners, from every other way, there's just no
way do I feel that a 42 [U.S.C. § 1983] suit would apply here in view of [RCW] 28B. 19.150. It's that
simple." Brief of Amicus Curiae, University of Washington Chapter, American Association of
University Professors at 2. Amici argued that this holding was legally erroneous. See id. at 2-14; Brief
of Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Washington at 3-13. The supreme court,
however, did not even mention the trial court's questionable holding.
This omission is problematic because it is unclear whether the trial court determined that Meyer's
constitutional claims were meritless based on the erroneous legal conclusion that Meyer was collaterally estopped from bringing this suit. If that conclusion was the basis of the trial court's fee award, the
fee award could not have been a valid exercise ofjudicial discretion. Since the basis of the trial court's
fee award may have been erroneous, the supreme court should have either remanded the case for
determination of the fees issue under the correct view of applicable law or determined the fees issue de
novo.

36. Meyer, 105 Wn.2d at 849-50, 719 P.2d at 100. Professor Meyer also alleged violations of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(c); violation of the rules of the University of Washington and the Open Public
Meetings Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 42.30 (1986); and defamation. Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at
849-50, 719 P.2d at 100.
37. Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at 850, 719 P.2d at 100.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 857, 719 P.2d at 104. Initially, the case was appealed to the state court of appeals. The
supreme court accepted the case on administrative transfer. Id. at 850, 719 P.2d at 100.
42. Id. at 850-52, 719 P.2d at 100-02.
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amendment. 43 The court went on to hold that, even if the disputed statements were protected speech, the faculty reprimand did not unconstitutionally chill Meyer's right to free speech."
The supreme court also affirmed dismissal of Meyer's due process
claim. 45 According to the.court, the reprimand did not deprive Meyer of
any property or liberty interest. 46 Although the court recognized Meyer's
property interest in proper application of the university's faculty code, 47 the
court found the chemistry faculty was not required to follow the faculty
code in issuing the reprimand. Thus, no deprivation of that property
interest occurred. 48 The court also refused to find that a property interest
was implicated by deprivation of Meyer's professional goodwill. 49 The
court reasoned that no deprivation of goodwill could have occurred, since
50
professional goodwill does not attach to the job of salaried professor.
Nor did the court find Meyer was deprived of any liberty interest. 5 1 The
court recognized that damage to reputation coupled with damage to a
protected interest constitutes deprivation of a liberty interest. 52 But the
court refused to find that such a deprivation occured in Meyer's case. 53 The
court based its rejection of Meyer's liberty interest argument on its finding
that Meyer's statements were not protected speech. 54 Also, the court
explained, affidavits contradicted Meyer's allegation that his reputation
55
was damaged.
In affirming the trial court's award of attorney fees to the university, 56 the
Meyer court cited Hughes v. Rowe 57 for the proposition that defendants may
recover attorney fees under the Fees Act when the plaintiff's action is
without merit. 58 The court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in finding Meyer's case was without merit. 59 Meyer's case lacked merit, in

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 851-52, 719 P.2d at 101.
Id. at 852, 719 P.2d at 101-02.
Id. at 855, 719 P.2d at 103.
Id. at 853-55, 719 P.2d at 102-03.
Id. at 853-54, 719 P.2d at 102-03.
Id. at 854, 719 P.2d at 102.
Id. at 853, 719 P.2d at 102.
Id.
Id. at 854-55, 719 P.2d at 103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 855, 719 P.2d at 103.
Id. at 856-57, 719 P.2d at 104.
449 U.S. 5 (1980).
Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at 856, 719 P.2d at 104.
Id. at 856-57, 719 P.2d at 104.
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the supreme court's view, because the record presented a picture of bickering adults,60 and because the courts are an inappropriate forum for settling
personal disputes among professional colleagues. 6 1 The court upheld the
62
attorney fees award to the defendant, University of Washington.

Ii.

THE MEYER COURT'S MISINTERPRETATION OF THE FEES
ACT

The Meyer court misapplied the Fees Act. 63 The standard used by the
Meyer court in approving the trial court's award of attorney fees is not
supported by legislative history, judicial precedent, or public policy. Even
if the standard applied by the Meyer court were correct, the court's
application of that standard was faulty. If other courts follow the Meyer
decision, the Fees Act will deter valid civil rights suits. This result is
profoundly adverse to the goals of civil rights legislation 64 and opposed to
65
the purpose of the Fees Act.

A.

The Incomplete Standard

The Meyer court's evaluation of the university's request for attorney fees
was based on the wrong standard. The court ruled, without explanation,
that defendants are entitled to fee awards under the Fees Act when a
plaintiff's claims are without merit, in the sense that they are groundless or
without foundation. 66 Although a defendant must show that plaintiff's
claims are meritless before a fees award should even be considered,
analysis of the Fees Act demonstrates that defendants should be required to
make a further showing that a plaintiff has litigated in bad faith.
60. Id. at 857, 719 P.2d at 104.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Since Meyer alleged causes of action under42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (see supra note 36 and
accompanying text), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (the Fees Act) was applicable. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g.,
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal. 1973) ("The raison d'etre
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to encourage the vindication of constitutional rights, to promote litigation of the
rights involved, and to give the courts leeway to fashion appropriate remedies."); see also SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3 (stating that "civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement"
and that "[n]ot to award counsel fees in cases such as this would be tantamount to repealing the Act itself
by frustrating its basic purpose") (citing Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973)).
65. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3 (reciting purpose of Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981)).
66. Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at 856, 719 P.2d at 104 (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980)).

Civil Rights Attorney Fees
1.

JudicialInterpretationsof the Fees Act

Courts have consistently recognized that Congress intended different
standards for attorney fees awards to prevailing plaintiffs than for awards to
prevailing defendants. 67 However, only the standard applicable to prevailing plaintiffs has been applied consistently. When adjudicating the claims
of prevailing plaintiffs for attorney fees, courts have generally followed the
standard set forth in the legislative reports and made awards except when
precluded by considerations of fairness. 68 However, judicial treatment of
the standard for awards of attorney fees to prevailing defendants has been
confusing and fails to conform fully to the legislative reports: The Supreme
Court has decided only two cases relevant to this subject, neither of which
is completely dispositive.

a. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC
In ChristiansburgGarmentCo. v. EEOC,69 the Supreme Court affirmed
a decision which declined to award attorney fees to prevailing defendants
under section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (section
706(k)). 70 Although Christiansburgdid not involve the Fees Act, the case
is relevant to the Fees Act because the operative language of section 706(k)
is identical to that of the Fees Act. 71 Christiansburgheld that a plaintiff
could not be assessed her opponent's attorney fees absent a finding that her
claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that she litigated after
the claim became so. 72 The Court refused, however, to establish a standard
for section 706(k) requiring that a plaintiff's action be brought in bad
faith. 73 The Court based this refusal on its finding that Congress, when it
enacted section 706(k), did not intend to limit the award of attorney fees for
prevailing defendants to situations of bad faith litigation. 74
67. See, e.g.. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980); Lotz Realty Co. v. United States Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 717 F.2d 929,931(4th Cir. 1983);Mayerv. Wedgewood Neighborhood Coalition,
707 F.2d 1020, 1021 (9th Cir. 1983).
68.

M. GELFAND, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND AMERIcAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT § 6-5(A),

at466 (1984); see alsoKnights ofKu Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 643 F.2d 1034,
1040 (5th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 636 (5th Cir. 1979); Sethy v. Alameda
County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1979).
69. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
70. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1981).
71. See id.; cf Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981).
72. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
73. Id. at 421.
74. Id.at 419.
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Hughes v. Rowe

Hughes v. Rowe 75 is the only case in which the United States Supreme
Court dealt directly with a fees award to a defendant under the Fees Act.
Nevertheless the Hughes Court did not fully explore the Fees Act standard,
holding only that the defendant was not entitled to attorney fees because the
plaintiff's claim was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, as required by Christiansburgfor section 706(k) claims. 76 The Hughes Court
could find no reason for applying a standard less stringent than that set out
in Christiansburg.77 Because the plaintiff's claims in Hughes did not fall
even to that minimum threshold of frivolousness, the Christiansburg
standard resolved the case. Therefore, the Hughes Court found it unnecessary to consider whether the Fees Act also requires defendants to show bad
faith. 78 Hughes left open the question of what additional standard, if any,
does apply to Fees Act claims. 79 However, the Court implied that an
additional and more stringent standard-for instance, a bad faith standard-might be appropriate in civil rights actions where the Fees Act
applies.80
c.

Misinterpretationof Hughes

The Meyer court incorrectly relied on Hughes v. Rowe for the proposition
that defendants may recover under the Fees Act in any case where the
plaintiff's action was groundless or without foundation. 81 Hughes did
apply that standard, but the Hughes Court was actually paraphrasing the
standard set forth in Christiansburgfor section 706(k) claims. Hughes
noted that standard as the minimum showing necessary for consideration of
defendant awards in Fees Act cases. 82 Hughes did not set a definitive
standard for defendant awards under the Fees Act.
75. 449 U.S. 5 (1980).
76. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 15.
77. Id. at 14.
78. Id.; see also Larson, Attorney's Fees Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 309,312 (1981) (pointing out that since the Court in Hughes neither cited
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981),
nor actually delineated the appropriate standard for § 1988 claims by defendants, it is "at least
possible" that future courts will apply the bad faith standard to § 1988 claims in lieu of the less stringent
Christiansburg standard). See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Christiansburgstandard.
79. See Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14.
80. See id. The Court stated "[allthough arguably a different standard might be applied in a civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we can perceive no reason for applying a less stringent
standard." Id. (emphasis added).
81. Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at 856.
82. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14.

Civil Rights Attorney Fees
No court since Hughes has examined fully the appropriate standard for
Fees Act claims or addressed the possibility that bad faith must be shown to
justify prevailing defendants' fee awards under the Fees Act. 83 Most circuit
courts of appeals considering claims in this context have, without satisfactory explanation, failed to consider the bad faith standard. 84 Instead, they
have applied to Fees Act claims the "frivolous, groundless, or without
85
merit" standard set forth in Christiansburgfor section 706(k) claims.
Assuming courts have not misread Hughes to require application of the
Christiansburgstandard to Fees Act claims, 86 their use of that standard can
only be explained by the similarity of language and purpose between
section 706(k) and the Fees Act. The crucial words of the two statutes are
identical. 87 Both seek to promote private enforcement of statutes that
88
protect important interests.
Given the similarities between section 706(k) and the Fees Act, it might
appear reasonable to apply the same standard to both statutes. But the
Christiansburgsection 706(k) standard should not be applied to Fees Act
claims for two reasons. First, the legislative intent of the Fees Act does not
support application of the Christiansburg standard. Second, Christiansburgwas not well reasoned. This is not to say that lower courts should
decline to follow a United States Supreme Court decision because it was
poorly reasoned. Rather, lower courts are not bound to follow Christiansburgwhen they interpret the Fees Act, and poor reasoning in Christiansburgis an important policy basis for not doing so.
2.

Legislative Intent

The Fees Act gives courts discretion to award attorney fees to prevailing
parties. 89 This discretion must be controlled by legislative intent as expressed in congressional reports. Statutory construction requires that terms
be interpreted in accordance with their plain meaning. However, this
general maxim is mitigated by the rule that courts should effectuate the
purpose of a statute90 and interpret ambiguous terms. 9 1 Both mitigating
83. See, e.g., Jensen v. Stangel, 790 F2d 721, 722-23 (9th Cir. 1985); Colombrito v. Kelly, 764
R2d 122, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1985); Lotz Realty Co. v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 717
F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1983); Glass v. Pfeffer, 657 F.2d 252, 256 (10th Cir. 1981).
84. See cases cited supra note 83.
85. See cases cited supra note 83.
86. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hughesholding.
87. CompareCivil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1981), with Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981).
88. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981).
90. J. SUIERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTON, § 46.01 (4th ed. 1984); see also
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factors apply to the Fees Act. Since the Fees Act seeks to provide an
effective mechanism for private enforcement of civil rights laws,92 judicial
discretion must be defined in accordance with that purpose. 93 Also, the
term "discretion" is ambiguous. 94 Therefore, the meaning of the Fees Act
must be gleaned from sources other than the statute's language.
The Supreme Court's decision to defer to the legislature when defining
the boundaries of judicial discretion to make fee awards furnishes another
reason for looking to legislative history. In Alyeska, the Court indicated that
Congress should define both the circumstances in which attorney fees
awards are appropriate and the boundaries of judicial discretion to make
such awards. 95 Congress did not set forth those boundaries in the Fees Act's
language. 96 Legislative reports accompanying the Fees Act did respond to
the Supreme Court's request in Alyeska. 97 Consistency with Alyeska requires that courts look to Congress' intent, as documented in legislative
reports, when determining the boundaries of judicial discretion under the
Fees Act.
Legislative reports accompanying the Fees Act demonstrate that Congress intended that fee awards to prevailing defendants be limited to cases
where plaintiffs litigate in bad faith. Lawmakers did express an intent,
however, that the standard for Fees Act awards be generally similar to the
standard which previously had been applied to claims under section
706(k). 98 This probably explains why courts seeking guidance in interpreting the Fees Act have looked to Christiansburg'sstandard for section
706(k).
However, in the Fees Act Congress clarified its intent by exclusively
citing earlierjudicial interpretations of section 706(k) which held bad faith
or its equivalent is required for awards of fees to prevailing defendants. 99
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (citing Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457,459 (1892), for the rule that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers").
91. J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 90, at § 45.02.
92. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
93. See generally J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 90, § 45.09.
94. See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980) (discussing the standard for the making of
discretionary awards, thereby demonstrating that "discretion" is too ambiguous a term to be interpreted
under the plain meaning rule).
95. Alyeska Pipeling Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981).
97. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-5.
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id. at 4. The report cites Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971),
aff'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that a fee award to a defendant's employer, was unjustified
where a claim of racial discrimination, though meritless, was made in good faith); United States Steel
Corp. v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 9 E.P.D. 10, 225 (3d Cir. 1975)
(holding that an unsuccessful plaintiff could be assessed his opponent's attorney fees only if his suit was
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The standard Congress had in mind when it made the comparison between
section 706(k) and the Fees Act was not the standard later applied by the
ChristiansburgCourt.
Even if the standard chosen by the ChristiansburgCourt for application
to section 706(k) claims was appropriate, its application to a Fees Act case
directly contradicts the Fees Act's legislative reports. 1°° The Christiansburgstandard, because it fails to require bad faith as a prerequisite to
sanctioning a plaintiff, contravenes the purpose of the Fees Act. The Act
seeks to encourage private litigation of bona fide civil rights claims. 1 1
Allowing awards to defendants without a showing of bad faith will deter
bona fide claims. More importantly., because it does not require a showing
of bad faith, the Christiansburgstandard makes it easier for defendants to
recover under the Fees Act than under common law. Under common law,
bad faith must be shown for a party to recover fees from one who has
pursued a frivolous lawsuit.102 Since private litigation is essential to enforcement of civil rights laws, it is difficult to imagine a principle that
would justify making fee recovery easier for prevailing defendants in
statutory civil rights actions than in common law actions.
3.

Flaws in Christiansburg

The ChristiansburgCourt, in accordance with the Alyeska decision and
principles of construction, looked to legislative intent when it interpreted
the discretion language of section 706(k). 103 The Court found little guidance in section 706(k) legislative history beyond indications that some
senators believed, in addition to encouraging meritorious suits, section
706(k) would deter frivolous suits. 104
Despite this absence of legislative history, the ChristiansburgCourt
determined that Congress, when it passed section 706(k), did not intend to
limit fee awards for prevailing defendants to cases in which plaintiffs
litigate in bad faith. 105 The Court reasoned that if Congress had intended to
limit defendants' attorney fees awards to cases involving bad faith claims,
no statute would have been necessary. Common law, the Court explained,
clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought for harassment purposes; i.e., brought in bad faith).
100. Compare Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978), with SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
101. SENATE RmORT, supra note 2, at 2.
102. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeling Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975)
(citing F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. United States exrelIndus. Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116, at 129 (1974),
and other authorities).
103. Christiansburg,434 U.S. at 418-21.
104. Id. at 420.
105. Id. at 419.
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allows attorney fees awards against parties who have proceeded in bad
faith. 106 This reasoning ignores the primary purpose of section 706(k),
which is to encourage plaintiffs to bring valid claims. 107 Congress likely
worded the statute the way it did to preserve the common law power of the
courts to award attorney fees as a sanction against bad faith suits. This
assumption is supported by Fees Act legislative reports which cite with
approval cases requiring a showing of bad faith for a section 706(k) fee
08
award to a prevailing defendant. 1
Christiansburg'srefusal to require a showing of bad faith, even if proper
for section 706(k) claims, should not be incorporated into the Fees Act. The
Christiansburg decision directly contradicts the intent of the Act. In
addition, Christiansburgwas based on faulty analysis-even as to section
706(k). While it might be argued that for consistency's sake the standard for
the Fees Act should be the same as that for section 706(k), "foolish
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." 10 9 Application of Christiansburg to Fees Act claims assures only that the standards applied are
consistently erroneous.
B.

The Meyer Court's Misapplicationof the Christiansburg Standard

The Meyer court applied the incomplete Christiansburgstandard to a
Fees Act claim. The court further erred by erroneously applying that
standard. The supreme court's analysis appears to have been directed not to
whether Meyer's claims were arguable, or reasonable, or had some foundation at the time they were filed, but rather to whether Meyer's claims were
legally sufficient to withstand summary judgment. The Christiansburg
Court expressly warned against this kind of reasoning. " 10 Moreover, the
Meyer court measured Meyer's claims by applying case authority decided
after the trial court's disposition of the Meyer case. " The Court in
106. Id. Cf Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968). The Christiansburg
Court cited Piggie Park for the proposition that if Congress intended to limit awards to defendants to
cases where plaintiffs litigated in bad faith, no statute would have been necessary. This was not,
however, what the Piggie Park Court wrote in the cited footnote. Rather, the Piggie Park Court
indicated that if Congress intended awards to plaintiffs only where defendants litigated in bad faith, no
statute would have been necessary. Given the plaintiff-oriented purpose of the fees statutes, the footnote
in Piggie Park does not logically support the ChristiansburgCourt's reasoning.
107. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
108. See supra note 99. The ChristiansburgCourt's reasoning is further weakened by the accepted
legislative practice of codifying common law principles, their intent being to strengthen and solidify,
rather than to weaken, those principles. See J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 90, § 50.01, at 421 n.4 and
cases cited therein.
109. R.W. Emerson, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS BY RALPH WALDO EMERSON 41(1961).
110. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978).
111. See infra notes 122-24, 127-28, 140-42 and accompanying text.
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Christiansburgcautioned against the temptation to engage in this kind of
post hoc reasoning. 112 Hindsight logic could, according to the ChristiansburgCourt, discourage all but the most airtight claims, since prospective plaintiffs can rarely be sure their claims will survive future judicial
decisions or legislative enactments. 113 Viewed in light of the law applicable
at the time Meyer filed and litigated his suit, Meyer's claims were neither
frivolous, unreasonable, nor groundless.
1.

The FirstAmendment Claim

In affirming the trial court's dismissal of Meyer's free speech claim, the
Washington Supreme Court held that Meyer's memoranda were not speech
protected by the first amendment. 114 The court went on to indicate that even
if the memoranda were protected, the chemistry faculty's reprimand did not
unconstitutionally chill Meyer's speech. 115
Nevertheless, Meyer's free speech claim had merit. The Meyer court
based its contrary holding on Connick v. Myers. 116 Notwithstanding Connick, Meyer's argument that the memoranda were protected speech was
reasonable for two reasons. First, Meyer's speech satisfied the Connick
public interest requirement. In Connick, the United States Supreme Court
indicated that speech of public employees is protected against employer
reprisals only if the speech relates to matters of public concern. 1 7 Meyer's
memoranda reasonably related to such matters. One memorandum dealt
with allocations of space for the chemistry department's library. 118 Another
dealt with the chemistry faculty's consideration of support for graduate
students;1 9 it criticized the chemistry faculty for failing to inform students
of new policies on graduate student support and for enacting the new
policies in a manner inconsistent with the faculty code. 120 Unlike the
speech considered in Connick, several of Meyer's memoranda did not relate
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Christiansburg,434 U.S. at 421-22.
Id. at422.
Meyer v. University of Washington, 105 Wn. 2d 847, 850-52, 719 P.2d 98, 101-02 (1986).
Id.at 852, 719 P.2d at 101-02.
Id. at 850-51, 719 P.2d at 100-01 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48, 151-52

(1983)).
117. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. The "speech" at issue in Connick consisted of a questionnaire
which sought the opinions of fellow employees on such matters as level of confidence in superiors and

the office transfer policy. The questionnaire was prepared by the complainant, Ms. Myers, in response
to an internal office decision to transfer her. One question on the questionnaire (regarding whether
employees felt pressure to participate in political campaigns) was considered by the Court to touch on a
matter of public concern, because it raised an issue of breach of public trust about which "public
employees should be able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal." Id.at 149.
118. Brief of Appellant at 8 n.2, Meyer.
119. Id. at 5.
120. Id.
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to or result from his concerns about his personal employment situation.
Further, the graduate student support memorandum, by pointing out improper procedures, exposed actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of
public trust. Connick explicitly recognized that exposure of impropriety is
an indication that speech relates to a matter of public concern. 12 1 It is
arguable, if not apparent, that Meyer's memoranda met the Connick public
interest requirement.
Second, whether Meyer's speech failed to meet the Connick test is
irrelevant to the question whether his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless as required by the Christiansburg standard. Connick was
handed down by the United States Supreme Court in April 1983.122 The
trial court decided Meyer in January 1983.123 The test whether a suit is
frivolous must be applied according to the law applicable at the time the
suit was filed. 124 It was error, therefore, to measure the merit of Meyer's
claims by Connick's yardstick.
Although the Meyer court held that the chemistry faculty's reprimand
did not unconstitutionally chill free speech, this finding on the substantive
merits does not mean Meyer's claim was frivolous. Several courts have held
that similar reprimands did chill free speech. 125 The Meyer court ignored
this line of decisions. Although the court noted that restrictions on a
reprimand's detrimental use may minimize its chilling effect, 126 the only
precedent cited for this proposition, Gregory v. Durham County Board of
Education,127 was decided after the trial court's disposition of Meyer.
Gregory, therefore, should have had no bearing on deciding whether
Meyer's case was frivolous. 128 Further, Meyer argued that decisions about
121. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.
122. See id. at 138 (bearing date of April 20, 1983).
123. See Findings and Order, supra note 30, at 19 (dated January 14, 1983). The Meyer court
mistakenly noted the date of the superior court summary judgment proceeding as February 16, 1984.
105 Wn. 2d at 848, 719 P.2d at 98. This mistaken date of decision may be the reason the Meyer court
repeatedly applied case authority decided after the disposition of the case at the trial court level.
124. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978).
125. See, e.g., Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 837-43 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that oral and
written reprimands based on ateacher's speech violated the first amendment); Columbus Educ. Ass'n v.
Columbus City School Dist., 623 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1980) (reversing lowercourt holding that, because
it was merely expression of school principal's opinion, principal's letter of reprimand did not implicate
the first amendment); Aebisher v. Ryan, 622 F.2d 651,655 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversing and remanding trial
court's summary decision that letters of reprimand had no chilling effect sufficient to implicate the first
amendment, Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the
chilling effect of the letters); Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 902-04 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding that
reprimand of a police officer for criticizing the department violated the first amendment); Croushorn v.
Board of Trustees, 518 F. Supp. 9, 39-41, 43 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (ordering expungement of a letter
criticizing a college professor for his speech).
126. Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at 852, 719 P.2d at 101.
127. 591 F. Supp. 145 (M.D. N.C. 1984).
128. See supra text accompanying note 124.
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his salary were affected by the reprimand.129 If the reprimand affected
Meyer's salary, then it did chill his free speech rights. Unlike the limited
reprimand conjured by the Meyer court, this reprimand was used to
Meyer's detriment.
2.

The Due ProcessClaim

a. Meyer's PropertyInterests
The Washington Supreme Court held that Meyer's due process claim was
properly denied because no protected interest was affected by the reprimand. 130 Meyer's due process claim was not, however, without foundation.
A protected interest was affected. Meyer possessed a property interest in
proper application of the faculty code.13 1 The Meyer court admitted this
contention would have merit if the chemistry faculty was required to apply
the faculty code when issuing the reprimand. 132 The court held, however,
that faculty disciplinary regulations apply only if a question arises about a
violation of a rule or regulation. 133 In the court's view, the faculty code did
not apply to Meyer's reprimand because no question was raised concerning
34
violation of a rule or regulation. 1
The court's reasoning is unsupported by the facts. First, the reprimand
does appear to have raised questions concerning a possible violation of
university rules and regulations. The reprimand requested that the chair of
the chemistry faculty document any instances of dishonesty and bring them
to the chemistry faculty's attention for possible referral to the university
administration for tenure removal proceedings in accordance with the rules
of the faculty code.135 This request impliedly accuses Meyer of previous
129. Reply Brief ofAppellant at 23, Meyer. Before the reprimand, Meyer received merit increases.
Id. (citing Clerk's Papers at 559). After the reprimand, Meyer received no merit increases. Id.
130. Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at 855, 719 P.2d at 103.
131. See Nostrand v. Little, 58 Wn. 2d 111, 132,361 P.2d 551, 564 (1961) (holding that the faculty
code is part of a tenured professor's contract).
132. Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at 853-54, 719 P.2d at 102.
133. Id. at 854,719 P.2d at 102. Cf. Brief of Appellants at 70, Meyer (citing University Handbook,
"Faculty Code," Faculty Disciplinary Regulations, § 25-73(A)). The cited "Faculty Code" section
provides:
When a question arisesconcerning an alleged violation by a member of the faculty of a rule or
regulation of the university, its schools, colleges or departments, and informalpreliminaryinquiry
appears warranted, such inquiry shall be undertaken by the appropriate chairman, dean, or by a
special investigating committee of three faculty members chosen by the Chairman of the Faculty
Council on Faculty Affairs and who are not directly involved in the questions being considered.
University Handbook, "Faculty Code," Faculty Disciplinary Regulations § 25-73(A) (emphasis
added).
134. Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at 854, 719 P.2d at 102.
135. See Findings and Order, supra note 30, at 12.
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dishonesty. Further, the parties disputed whether the reprimand contained
clauses which directly accused Meyer of violating a rule found in the
faculty code against dishonesty.136 Even under the court's own analysis,
which limited the applicability of the faculty code to inquiries about rule
violations, the faculty code might reasonably be applied to the action taken
by the chemistry faculty. Accordingly, Meyer was justified in contending
that his property interest in proper application of the faculty code was
37
adversely affected by the reprimand. 1
Meyer's argument that his property interest in professional goodwill was
affected by the reprimand also had merit. The court dismissed this argument because Meyer did not submit evidence of actual damage. 138 In the
court's view, any possible damage set forth by plaintiff was to his position
as a professor at the university, a position to which no recognizable
goodwill attaches. 139 Again, the Washington Supreme Court used post hoc
reasoning. Only after the trial court's dismissal of Meyer did the supreme
court decide-in the 1984 case of In re Marriage of Halll4 0-that no
professional goodwill interest is enjoyed by salaried professionals. 141 Even
if Meyer would have had the foresight to engage in an inquiry about whether
salaried professionals have goodwill, he would have been justified in
concluding that it was at least possible that college professors may enjoy
42
professional goodwill. 1
b.

Meyer's Liberty Interests

The reprimand also affected Meyer's liberty interests. Arguably, Meyer
was "stigmatized" by the reprimand's explicit and implicit charges of
136. See Brief of Appellant at 7, Meyer (citing Clerk's Papers at 728); see also Findings and Order,
supra note 29, at 12; cf Reply Brief of Respondents at 52-65. The motion to reprimand Meyer
contained a preamble. The contents of that preamble were disputed by the parties. Meyer contended that
it contained a paragraph which made direct reference to § 25-51-4 of the "Faculty Code." The
university contended that this paragraph was part of the draft of the reprimand, but was omitted from the
final version. The trial court, in its findings of fact, set forth the text of the reprimand without the
disputed paragraph. The trial court provided no explanation or discussion of the dispute.
137. The reasonableness of Meyer's contention is bolstered by the grievance committee's decision
that the reprimand violated the faculty code. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
138. Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at 853, 719 P.2d at 102.
139. Id.
140. 103 Wn. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984).
141. Hall, 103 Wn. 2d at 242, 692 P.2d at 178. The cited decision occurred after the trial court's
disposition of Meyer. See supra note 123. The court in Hall indicated that determinations of goodwill
must start with an inquiry about whether a particular profession has goodwill. Hall, 103 Wn. 2d at 243,
692 P.2d at 179. However, the court also explained that Washington goodwill cases prior to Hall did not
recognize the need for this preliminary inquiry. Id.
142. In any event, in 1983, at the time summary judgment in the Meyer case was granted, Meyer's
argument that he had been deprived of a property interest because he had been deprived of "professional
goodwill" was a reasonable argument.
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dishonesty. In Paulv. Davis, 143 the United States Supreme Court held that
stigma to reputation caused by state action is not, in itself, a deprivation of
liberty sufficient to require due process. 144 An injury to reputation which
implicates another protected interest, however, does constitute a liberty
deprivation requiring due process. 145 Where the government, by stigmatizing an individual, takes away a right the individual previously enjoyed,
46
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential. 1
Since Meyer was stigmatized in connection with a deprivation of his
right to speak his mind, 147 the injury to his reputation conceivably implicated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Meyer presented
a reasonable argument that the university stigmatized him and deprived
him of his first amendment rights without notice and opportunity to be
heard. 148The Meyer court held that since a denial of Meyer's right to speak
his mind was justifiable, it could take place without due process. 149 However, this finding does not compel the conclusion that Meyer's suit was
frivolous. Since Meyer's first amendment claim had merit, 150 his liberty
interest argument must also be considered meritorious.
C. Impact and Alternatives
The stifling effect the Meyer decision will have on litigation of bona fide
civil rights claims directly contravenes the intent of the Fees Act to
encourage private enforcement of civil rights laws. 151 The importance of
private enforcement cannot be overstated. The senate report went so far as
to say that without fee shifting provisions which encourage private enforcement, our civil rights laws will become nothing but "hollow pronounce52
ments which the average citizen cannot enforce." 1
The effectiveness of the Fees Act will be seriously undermined if courts
award attorney fees to defendants in civil rights cases like Meyer. The
decision has received national publicity, particularly among employees of
educational institutions and attorneys for those institutions. 5 3 The finan143. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
144. Paul, 424 U.S. at 702.
145. See id. at 708-09.
146. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
147. See supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
148. Id.
149. Meyer, 105 Wn. 2d at 854-55, 719 P.2d at 103.
150.- Id.
151. See supra notes 2, 23 and accompanying text.
152. SENATE REPoRr, supra note 2, at 6.
153. See, e.g., ProfessorIs Told to Pay $50,000 to Universityfor "Frivolous" Lawsuit, Chronicle
of HigherEduc., May28, 1986, at I, col. 3; ProfessorLosesLaw Suit andMustPay LegalFees, Chapel
Hill Newspaper, Chapel Hill, N.C., May 28, 1986. Steve Milam, Assistant Attorney General for the
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cial risk of bringing a suit to enforce civil rights laws has been increased by
the Meyer decision. This risk undoubtedly will decrease the number of
valid complaints which are filed. 154 Such an outcome will undermine the
enforcement of civil rights laws. Further, fee awards like the one in Meyer
force plaintiffs to settle cases they would otherwise appeal, thereby imped55
ing judicial clarification of civil rights laws. 1
Meyer will deter frivolous suits and those brought in bad faith. This
aspect of the decision deserves applause. Strain on public resources is only
part of the cost of lawsuits against public educational institutions like the
University of Washington. Lawsuits can inhibit the ability of a university to
recruit talented staff members, strain relations among current staff mem1 56
bers, and detract generally from the effectiveness of the institution.
Nevertheless, these concerns fail to approach the importance of the civil
rights enforcement the Fees Act seeks to encourage. Moreover, a bad faith
standard adequately addresses these concerns.
Courts have two alternatives to Meyer's analysis of the Fees Act. Courts
could apply the "bad faith" standard set forth in the legislative history of
State of Washington, who briefed and argued the Meyer case on behalf of the University of Washington,
gave a presentation on the case at a conference of the National Association of College and University
Attorneys (NACUA) on June 22, 1986. Interview with Steve Milam, Assistant Attorney General, State
of Washington, in Seattle (Sept. 25, 1986).
154. Civil rights litigation is unlikely to be funded by civil rights plaintiffs. Such plaintiffs rarely
have the financial resources to adequately compensate their attorneys. Only three other realistic means
of financing such litigation exist: (1) legal aid and civil rights organizations financed by private
donations and/or government; (2) legal services provided by private law firms pro bonopublico; and (3)
fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs. Resources for the first two of these alternatives are extremely scarce.
See Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 7 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 381, 408-10
(1971); Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, American Civil Liberties Union, and Legal Aid Society of New York, in
Support of Respondents, Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531 (1985), rehearingdenied 106 S. Ct. 2909
(1986), reprinted in 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 633, 636-39 (1986) [hereinafterAmici Brief,
JeffD. with page references to reprint].
Plaintiffs fee awards, while providing some compensation, do not afford an attorney a possible
windfall (unlike personal injury contingent fee cases in which a possible windfall justifies taking a risk
that compensation will not occur). Furthermore, persons whose civil rights have been violated have
little economic incentive to pursue actions in court. Often, the amount recovered does not even cover the
cost of litigation. See Amici Brief, JeffD., supra this note, at 637 n. 11, and cases cited therein.
In summary, the financial impediments to bringing civil rights suits are great. Adding the financial
risk of being forced to pay an opponent's attorney fees can only decrease the already low odds that a civil
rights action will be brought when a civil rights violation occurs. See also Rowe, Predictingthe Effects
ofAttorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1984).

155. Fee awards to defendants undoubtedly deter plaintiffs from appealing because they encourage
pre-appeal settlement. In the Meyer case, for example, the university agreed to relinquish the fee award
in exchange for, among other concessions, Meyer's agreement not to appeal the case. U. of Washington
Agrees Not to Collect Legal Feesfrom Professor Who Sued It, Chronicle of Higher Educ., July 9, 1986,
at 19.
156. Interviews with James B. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, State of Washington,
and Steve Milam, Assistant Attorney General, State of Washington, in Seattle (Sept. 25, 1986).
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the Fees Act.157 Although a bad faith standard might permit some frivolous
suits, summary judgment procedures could minimize their costs. Moreover, since common law provides an exception to the "no fees" rule for
cases in which a party litigates in bad faith, defendants would get as much
protection under the Fees Act as they have under common law.
An alternative to a bad faith standard is proper application of the
Christiansburgstandard. While the Christiansburgstandard would deter
more valid claims than a bad faith standard, careful application could make
this standard generally consistent with the purpose of the Fees Act. For
example, to avoid deterring valid civil rights actions by misapplying
Christiansburg,courts can avoid hindsight analyses in making determinations of frivolousness. In addition, courts can sharply distinguish cases
which are meritless in the sense of that they are appropriate for summary
judgment, from cases which are meritless in the sense that they lack any
reasonable foundation in fact or in law. Courts can further avoid misapplication of the Christiansburgstandard by determining whether, at the time the
suit was filed,' 5 8 any reasonable argument could have been made that the
plaintiff had a valid claim.
One additional safeguard against misapplication of the Christiansburg
standard is suggested by the competing policies of encouraging valid civil
rights claims and deterring claims brought without basis. Judges can ask
themselves whether the possible deterrent effect of an award on frivolous
and bad faith suits outweighs the chilling effect the award might have on
valid claims. Such an inquiry would appropriately focus attention on the
59
Fees Act's policies, which should define the limits of judicial discretion.1
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Meyer v. University of Washington, Washington's supreme court
misinterpreted Hughes v. Rowe to require application of Christiansburg's
"frivolous, groundless, or without merit" standard to a defendant's Fees
Act claim. The Meyer court's erroneous use of the Christiansburgstandard
gave the Fees Act a deterrent effect contrary to its purpose. The court
compounded its error by applying the Christiansburgstandard incorrectly.
The Meyer court's evaluation of Meyer's constitutional claims is marred by
the kind of hindsight logic deplored by the ChristiansburgCourt. In
addition, Meyer muddles the distinction between a losing case and a
157. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
158. There may be situations in which a case which was reasonable when filed becomes unreasonable because of changes in the law. Continuing to litigate after a case becomes frivolous is, of course,
tantamount to filing a frivolous suit.
159. See supra notes 18, 85-91 and accompanying text.
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frivolous case. Although Meyer brought a case which he lost, his case was
not frivolous, groundless, or without merit.
Any benefit the Meyer decision might provide cannot outweigh the harsh
effect the case could have on the credibility of civil rights laws. The Meyer
court failed to recognize the important policies served by the Fees Act and
rendered a decision which impedes those policies and the realization of
civil rights.
John Warner Widell

